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The paper investigates the feasibility of using a variant of the spatial 
equilibrium model to estimate the productivity effects of a specific infrastructure 
project in New Zealand. Policy makers are interested in the marginal effects of 
infrastructure investment on productivity and an evaluation of such effects would 
provide a useful check on the appropriateness and adequacy of current decision 
rules and institutions. To date, there appear to be no examples of using a spatial 
equilibrium model to estimate the productivity effects of a specific infrastructure 
project. However, the analysis in this paper suggests that such an approach is 
feasible. There is a range of data and estimation issues that needs to be addressed 
in the use of a spatial equilibrium model for this purpose, but we find that a 
reasonably useful range of data is available in New Zealand. The next step in 
determining feasibility is to select a particular infrastructure project, and to 
develop an empirical model based on available data. 
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Policy makers are interested in whether additions to the infrastructure 
stock will have positive effects on firm productivity and growth in per capita 
incomes. There is a considerable, but somewhat inconclusive, empirical literature 
that attempts to estimate the effects of infrastructure investment on productivity 
growth. The general conclusion from this literature is that productivity effects are 
contingent on a range of factors. These factors include the adequacy of the 
existing infrastructure stock and the existence or potential existence of 
complementary investments in physical and human capital (De la Fuente, 2000; 
O’Fallon, 2003). 
A first question of interest to policy makers is whether at current 
margins the overall level of investment in infrastructure is optimal for productivity 
growth. A second perhaps more important question is whether a particular sort of 
infrastructure investment at a particular point of time and in a particular place is 
likely to have nett positive effects on productivity (whether in a particular region 
or in aggregate). 
In practice, infrastructure investments are made with a variety of 
objectives according to decision rules that only imperfectly reflect those 
objectives. Depending on institutional arrangements, there is considerable scope 
for political judgment to influence decisions. There are many conceptual and 
operational problems in the methodologies used, and typically there is 
considerable uncertainty about the scope and size of the effects to be incorporated 
into the analysis. 
Knowledge about whether current investments are having a positive 
effect on productivity could help guide decisions about the overall level of 
infrastructure investments. This knowledge could also guide decisions about 
which types of infrastructure to invest in and where to make those investments, 
and about whether decision rules might be amended to better reflect an interest in 
investment effects on productivity. However, the use of ex-post evaluation of the 
effect of a public infrastructure investment on firm productivity is rare in 
New Zealand. 
1 The purpose of this study is to identify empirical methodologies that 
can help answer these questions, and to investigate the feasibility of applying 
them in New Zealand. In particular, ex-post evaluation offers the possibility of 
assessing whether the decision rules used and institutional arrangements are likely 
to lead to infrastructure provision that has nett positive effects on productivity and 
amenity values. It may also help clarify the extent to which decisions have 
favoured either productivity gains or the achievement of other objectives such as 
an increase in amenity values.  
The remainder of this report is organised as follows. Section 2 
summarises the decision rules used for making infrastructure investments within 
New Zealand and examines the extent to which infrastructure decisions focus on 
economic growth (productivity) objectives. Section 3 identifies the strengths and 
weaknesses of alternative ex-post methodologies for examining the effects on 
productivity of an infrastructure investment, and elaborates on the preferred 
spatial equilibrium methodology. Section 4 investigates the feasibility (e.g. 
availability of data) for measuring, ex-post, the productivity of an infrastructure 
investment within New Zealand, using the preferred methodology. 
1.1 Scope 
At the broadest level, infrastructure stocks can be divided into three 
types: economic, social, and institutional. Economic infrastructure relates to assets 
that provide services used in production and final consumption, social 
infrastructure supports a healthy workforce with adequate skills, and institutional 
infrastructure includes market operations and legal property rights (New Zealand 
Institute of Economic Research, 2004). Because the focus of this paper is on the 
relationship between physical infrastructure investment and firm productivity, we 
will focus our review on economic infrastructure stocks. 
Following the definitions used in New Zealand Institute of Economic 
Research (2004) the distinguishing characteristics of infrastructure assets are 
taken to be: 
1.  Capacity can only be adjusted in large, ‘lumpy’ increments. 
2.  There are high initial fixed costs and risk of asset stranding as conditions 
(such as tastes and technology) change. 
2  
3.  There are multiple users of the services, spanning production and final 
consumption. 
4.  Externalities are not reflected in service charges. 
5.  Scale and regulatory hurdles create long lead times for installing new capacity. 
Again following official definitions,
1,2,3 we identify four main 
categories of infrastructure assets: 
1.  energy: all gas and electricity and petroleum assets (except retailing) 
2.  transport: roads, rail tracks and rolling stock, airport and dock facilities 
3.  water: supply and wastewater treatment including water capture, wastewater 
treatment, bulk distribution, local reticulation, irrigation, and flood protection 
4.  telecommunications: wireless and cellular transmission towers, transmission 
lines, local loops, and international connections. 
2  Public infrastructure investment decision 
rules and methods 
Public infrastructure investments are not random events. Planners 
(sensibly) assess the need for public infrastructure and direct investment to where 
they consider the need to be the greatest. The reasons that underlie a decision to 
invest in public infrastructure have important consequences for the benefits 
associated with the investment. For example, if the sole aim of investing in the 
road network is to reduce the accident rate, then it is possible that the productivity 
benefits from the project will be negligible. It is therefore important to understand 
the decision process that has shaped public infrastructure investments when 
evaluating their effect on firm productivity. 
The purpose of this section is to examine the extent to which 
infrastructure investment decisions focus on economic growth (productivity) 
objectives and whether the decision rules adequately reflect the objectives. Table 
1 lists the main New Zealand infrastructure stocks, that fall within the four main 
categories outlined in Section 1.1 (energy, transport, water, and 
                                                 
1 Infrastructure stocktake report back, CAB M (04) 16/6. 
2 For a comprehensive review of New Zealand infrastructure stocks see PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
(2004). 
3 For this review we have also included oil assets (refinery and distribution) and flood protection. 
3 telecommunications) and identifies the institutions that are involved in making the 
infrastructure investment decisions. 
Table 1: Public infrastructure investment decision-making process 
 
 Infrastructure  Type  Institution(s)  responsible 
for investment decisions 
    
1 Electricity  Generation  Private/SOEs 
2  Electricity Transmission Grid  SOE (Transpower) 
3  Electricity Line distribution  Private 
4  Gas Supply and Transmission Private 
    
5  Local roads  Public (TLAs) 
6  State highways  Public (Transit New 
Zealand) 
7  Rail Passenger Services  Private/Public (RCs
1) 
8  Rail Freight services  Private 
9  Rail Track Network  SOE
2
10 Sea/Air  Private/Public 
    
11  Water Supply  Public (RC
1/TLAs) 
12  Sewage Treatment  Public (TLA) 
13 Irrigation  Private 
14 Flood  protection  Public  (RC
1/TLAs) 
    
15 Telecommunications  Private 
Notes: 
State owned enterprise (SOE), regional council (RC), territorial local authority (TLA) 
1 Wellington and Auckland Regional Councils 
2 The rail network was sold by the Government to Tranz Rail Holdings Limited in 1993. In 
December 2001 the Auckland rail corridor was sold back to the Government and the remaining rail 




Table 1 shows that infrastructure investment within New  Zealand is 
conducted by a number of different types of organisations: private companies, 
state owned enterprises (SOEs), and central and local government authorities 
(Transit New Zealand, territorial local authorities (TLAs), and regional councils 
(RCs)). Privately operated companies and SOEs are responsible for investment in 
electricity and gas infrastructure services, irrigation, and telecommunications. 
Direct government involvement in public infrastructure investment, by central and 
local government authorities, is restricted to roads, the rail track network, and 
water infrastructure. 
Private and public decisions to invest in infrastructure may also be 
influenced by regulation of prices and quantity of services, and regulation of 
access to networks, and by environmental regulation that may affect the cost of 
production or certainty of return on the costs of development.  
The extent to which infrastructure investment promotes economic 
(productivity) growth may differ between private and public institutions. Private 
organisations will want to invest in infrastructure stocks to raise profits, whereas 
public organisations may have a range of economic, social, and environmental 
objectives. A complete review of the decision rules adopted by the institutions 
listed in Table 1 is not practical as part of this report. In some cases information 
about investment decisions is not easily available (e.g. private organisations) or 
the time required to compile the information is prohibitive. The remainder of this 
section will focus on road transport infrastructure and the investment decision 
rules used by the institutions involved. Investment in road infrastructure was 
chosen because the rules for investment are transparent, consistently applied to all 
road projects, and are easily accessible from Land Transport New  Zealand’s 
website.
4
TLAs and Transit New Zealand are responsible for the identification 
and proposal of road maintenance and construction projects. Land Transport 
New Zealand (LTNZ) approves projects for funding by ensuring the project is 
economically viable
5 and meets the requirements of the Land Transport 
                                                 
4 www.ltsa.govt.nz 
5 The benefits outweigh the cost of the project. 
5 Management Act 2003 (LTMA).
6 The main objectives of the National Land 
Transport Programme (NLTP), administered by LTNZ, are to assist with 
economic development, assist with safety and personal security, improve access 
and mobility, protect and promote public health, and ensure environmental 
sustainability. The LTMA specifies that LTNZ should not prioritise any of the 
five key objectives and that all the objectives need to be considered equally in the 
planning process. The five key objectives, listed above, are applied at a macro 
level as individual road projects may focus on a couple of objectives. LTNZ uses 
a cost–benefit approach to assess whether the benefits from a road project 
outweigh the construction costs. Each decision rule does not focus on a particular 
objective (e.g. economic growth), but reflects the overall benefit to the 
community. For example, a reduction in travel times might be of benefit to firms 
by lowering their transport costs and to households by making the school run 
quicker. However, the decision rules are ambiguous in terms of how much a road 
project would contribute to each objective considered by LTNZ. For example, 
reducing accidents would probably make road travel safer, but a reduction in the 
accident rate could also have an economic growth effect by reducing transport 
costs because of fewer traffic delays caused by accidents. 
Estimating, ex-ante, the economic (productivity) effects of a road 
transport investment using the current road transport decision rules is difficult for 
the following reasons. First, a decision to invest in a road improvement is 
motivated by a range of objectives (and not solely to promote economic growth), 
therefore, it is difficult to separate out the effect on economic growth from other 
effects (e.g. social and environmental). Second, the cost–benefit approach, used 
by LTNZ to estimate the ex-ante benefits of a road improvement, cannot fully 
capture the wider economic benefits of a road investment. The cost–benefit 
approach is a static model that ignores the effect a road project might have on the 
behaviour of firms and workers. For example, a road improvement may attract 
more firms and workers to an area, which may lead to productivity growth due to 
agglomeration effects. Ex-post evaluation would be better able to separately 
identify the specific economic (productivity) growth effects from an infrastructure 
                                                 
6 Appendix A provides a detailed description of the objectives and assessment process of road 
investment within New Zealand. 
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investment, as well as capture the wider economic benefits associated with new 
infrastructure. 
3  Ex-post evaluation of the effect of public 
infrastructure investment on productivity 
growth 
The empirical literature assumes that public infrastructure stocks are a 
pure public good, available to all firms within some predefined geographic 
boundary. The ideal method of analysis of the role of infrastructure in production 
is to collect data on individual firms, calculate the marginal productivity of 
infrastructure for each firm, and then aggregate these individual productivities. In 
practice, sufficient data on individual firms is unavailable and researchers have 
turned to the analysis of aggregate outcomes. 
Aggregate production functions (APFs) have been widely used in the 
literature to estimate the productivity of public infrastructure.
7 APFs assume that, 
for a given production technology, variation in aggregate firm production will be 
positively related to public infrastructure provision. An aggregate production 
function typically assumes that aggregate output is a function of private capital, 
employment and public capital. The coefficient on public capital is interpreted as 
the productivity of infrastructure. Another approach is to estimate the productivity 
of infrastructure using an aggregate cost function (ACF) model.
 8 Both the APF 
and ACF models assume that factors of production (e.g. capital and labour) are 
immobile. 
The assumption that either production quantities (APF) or prices (ACF) 
are fixed is unlikely to hold in the real world. If public infrastructure is productive 
then increasing infrastructure stocks within a region will raise the productivity of 
                                                 
7 See De la Fuente (2000) for a comprehensive review of APF models and Appendix A for a brief 
summary of the issues raised in using them. 
8 The difference between the APF and ACF approaches is in the assumptions they make about 
individual firm behaviour. APF models assume that productive inputs are exogenously determined 
(i.e. firms do not alter their production technology in response to changes in available 
infrastructure stocks). Increasing a productive public infrastructure stock, within an APF model, 
raises the productivity of the available (fixed) inputs. ACF models assume that input decisions are 
endogenous to production decisions, whereas input prices in a competitive economy are 
exogenous. Under this scenario, firms respond to a costless increase in a productive public 
infrastructure stock by substituting more of the infrastructure service into their production 
technology (for other inputs) to reduce the marginal cost of production. 
7 the existing firms and increase the attractiveness of the region as a production 
site.
9 If firms are assumed to be profit maximising then they will prefer (and want 
to move production to) locations that offer greater site-specific productivity 
gains.
10 Firm migration will increase demand for local production inputs and firms 
may alter their production technology to reflect changes in the relative prices of 
the production inputs. For example, if land is fixed within predefined boundaries, 
an increase in demand for production sites, within a region, will raise the price of 
land, and firms may substitute land for labour. Under the scenario of factor 
mobility, both production quantities and input prices cannot be treated as being 
exogenous to a region because public infrastructure investment may induce 
changes in regional factor prices. Aggregate models do not control for the fact that 
regional factor price differentials might reflect part of the value of public 
infrastructure stocks (Haughwout, 2002) and, therefore, cannot adequately 
estimate the marginal productivity of public capital (if factors of production are 
mobile). 
A spatial equilibrium model assumes firms and households compete for sites 
across locations until profits, achievable by firms, and utility, achievable by 
households, are equal across all locations. This is the opposite to the assumption 
made by aggregate models, which assume that firms enjoy location-specific 
profits due to an increase in the productivity of inputs or lower costs of 
production. At equilibrium, firms and households have no incentive to move and 
differences in local factor prices (e.g. rents and wages), between locations, are 
fully explained by differences in unpriced and non-traded regional traits (e.g. 
public infrastructure stocks and climate). The following discussion of the basic 
spatial equilibrium model of firm and household behaviour is based on the 
                                                 
9 This assumes that the productivity benefits do not spill over regional boundaries and that regions 
have a fixed geographical area. 
10 As long as the benefits of moving outweigh the cost of relocating. The theoretical models below 
assume zero relocation costs. 
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approach taken by Roback (1982) and expanded upon by Haughwout (2002). The 
model assumes a set of regions that vary only by the level of an endowed amenity 
(this could include public infrastructure stocks). It also assumes that any increase 
in infrastructure stocks is externally funded. Residents within a region consume 
and produce a composite good (X), whose price is determined by world markets. 
Private capital and labour are completely mobile. Workers face zero relocation 
costs between regions, commuting between regions is assumed prohibitive (too 
costly), and intra-city commuting is ignored. The land within a region is used for 
either production of a composite good or is consumed by households. Land use is 
mobile between the two users. 
The model uses a production function for firms similar to the APF 
model and is given by: 
{ } j j j j m n G x , , =  
where  x is firm production in region j,  G is the level of available 
infrastructure stocks, n is private employment, and m is land used by a firm in 
production.
11 A firm’s demand for production inputs, labour, and land is a 
function of their relative prices. Firms minimise costs subject to the production 
function so that the (unit) cost of production equals the price of good X (under the 
assumption that profits are zero everywhere). As shown here: 
{ } x j j j P G R W c = , , 
A firm’s cost of production depends on wages (W), land prices (R), and 
infrastructure provision. A change in the infrastructure stock in a region is 
productive if it increases a firm’s output or reduces its costs of production. 
Households are assumed to be identical in tastes and skills. Leisure is 
ignored and households supply a single unit of labour independently of the wage 
rate. Households choose between the consumption of land, within a region, and 
the composite good (X) subject to their wage income (other income is ignored). 
Household utility is a function of wages, rents, and public infrastructure provision, 
                                                 
11 Exclusion of private capital has no effect on regional economic equilibrium, as long as it is 
freely mobile and its price is nationally determined. Returns from private capital are constant 
across locations and are not influenced by infrastructure, but could be related to relative prices of 
land and labour, which are affected by public infrastructure provision. 
9 subject to a given utility value (equal across locations). Households require an 
equilibrium wage that, given local land prices and infrastructure stocks, enables 
them to achieve a utility level equal to levels elsewhere. A household’s wage 
(income) is given by: 
) , , , ( V P G R e W x j j j =  
where a household’s wages (W) are equal to household expenditure 
(e(.)) at a nationally determined utility level (V ). A household’s expenses depend 
on land prices, the level of public infrastructure stocks, the price of the composite 
good, and utility. Public capital is directly valuable as a consumption good if a 
change in infrastructure stocks increases utility, or equivalently decreases 
household expenditure. 
The firm cost and household expenditure functions show that rents and 
wages can be determined as functions of public infrastructure stocks for a given 
level of utility (Roback, 1982). At equilibrium (equal profit rate and utility across 
all locations), rents and wages can be defined as: 
) , , (
) , , (
*
*
V G P W W






Rents and wages are determined by the price of the composite good X, 
local infrastructure provision, and national utility. Since Px and V  are 
exogenously determined, G is the only location-specific parameter and therefore 
fully explains rent and wage differentials between locations. Households and 
firms divide themselves across regions based on the variation in levels of site-
specific amenities and the relative marginal benefit of public infrastructure stocks 
to households and firms. 
When production factors are mobile, the relationship between aggregate 
output and the provision of public goods will represent a combination of the effect 
of public infrastructure on productivity, local prices (that reflect the valuation of 
locations as production or residential sites), and the response of firms and 
households (workers) to these local price changes (Haughwout, 1998). 
Local prices adjust following a change in demand for land and labour 
for firms and land for households following an exogenous (costless) increase in 
10  
public infrastructure stocks. The size and magnitude of these differentials depends 
on the relative value of a site-specific infrastructure stock to firms and households. 
Figure 1 illustrates three types of public capital investments and their effect on 
equilibrium rents and wages. The first investment is purely productive and 
households are indifferent, the second investment is a pure amenity that firms are 
indifferent to, and the third is an investment where both firms and households 
place some value on the investment. 
The downward sloping curves represent a firm’s cost function (C(.)), 
where unit costs of production are equal at all points along the curve. The upward 
sloping curves plot equal household utility levels (V(.)). If an increase in the level 
of public infrastructure stocks (G* to G΄) is purely productive to firms 
(households are indifferent), then the iso-cost curve will shift out. Firms will 
increase their demand for land and labour in the location with more productive 
infrastructure stocks, which will push up rents (R* to R΄) and wages (W* to W΄). 
(Households, to remain indifferent, have to be compensated for an increase in 
rents with higher wages.) Rents and wages will stop increasing when there is no 
longer an incentive for firms to move production to the region because the greater 
site-specific productivity gains equal the additional costs of rent and wages. If an 
increase in infrastructure stocks is amenity positive (firms are indifferent) then the 
iso-utility curve will shift upwards (from G* to G΄΄). Households will increase 
their demand for land (R* to R΄΄) in amenity-rich locations and firms will be 
compensated with lower wages (W* to W΄΄). When a public capital investment is 
both productive and amenity positive, rents will always increase, whereas the 
change in the wage rate is ambiguous and will depend on the relative valuation of 
the infrastructure investment to firms and households. 









W΄΄  W΄ W*
C(w,r,G΄) 
 
Firms and households react to a change in the relative prices of land and 
labour by changing their production technology (in the case of firms) and 
consumption behaviour (in the case of households). For example, if rents become 
relatively more expensive compared with wages, both firms and households 
economise on land. Firms produce using more labour and households consume 
more of the region’s composite good (X). Therefore, the region can support more 
firms and workers earning the equilibrium profit and utility wages, which results 
in an increase in the region’s output irrespective of whether the public good is 
purely productive or is of value only to households (an amenity). How much the 
price of land and labour changes, within a particular region, will depend on the 
shape of the firms’ production technology (C(.)) and households’ preferences 
(V(.)), shown in Figure 1. Haughwout (1998) shows algebraically that, without 
knowing the functional forms of a firm’s production technology and a 
household’s preferences, the sign of the effect of public infrastructure investment 
on aggregate productivity is ambiguous. Under some conditions, increases in 
marginal productivity due to a rise in the provision of public goods can reduce 
aggregate output, even if households are indifferent to the public good, whereas a 
zero marginal productivity effect does not imply that aggregate productivity will 
12  
also be zero. Haughwout (2002) concludes that it is not possible to use aggregate 
output and local factor prices to uncover the true productivity of infrastructure. 
The only solution is to directly observe changes in local factor prices (wages and 
rents) to measure the communities’ ‘willingness to pay’. By including 
employment and land use data it is possible to disaggregate a communities 
willingness to pay into those benefits that go to firms and the gains to households 
from an infrastructure investment. 
The aggregate models discussed at the beginning of this section assume 
a static world where a firm’s production technology (APF) or a firm’s input prices 
(ACF) are fixed and will not adjust following an infrastructure investment. On the 
other hand, if factors of production are mobile, a productive infrastructure 
investment would increase demand for production inputs, raising prices and 
inducing firms to adjust their production technology in response to the change in 
prices. The spatial equilibrium model is able to control for adjustments in input 
prices and production technologies following an infrastructure investment. 
Therefore, the spatial equilibrium model would be the preferred model for 
estimating the ex-post productivity effects of an infrastructure project.  
However, some of the assumptions made by the spatial equilibrium 
model require careful consideration (and are discussed in more detail in the next 
section). First, if workers are able to commute between regions, then the benefits 
from a public infrastructure investment may spill over into the adjacent regions. 
Therefore, it is important to carefully define the region to eliminate inter-regional 
commuting of workers. A similar point applies if the amenity value of 
infrastructure spills across regions. Second, the spatial equilibrium model assumes 
that the supply of land to firms and households is inelastic. If the supply of land is 
neither elastic nor inelastic, then the adjustment in land rents and wages may be 
mitigated by an increase in housing and worker supply. Third, it is unlikely that 
land will be completely mobile between users (firms and households), as local 
authorities often restrict land use to designated zones. Fourth, the spatial 
equilibrium model assumes that firms are identical (they produce a single good 
using the same production technology); therefore, the productivity effect of an 
infrastructure investment will be the same for all firms. However, if firms produce 
different goods (using different production technologies), the productivity effect 
13 of an infrastructure improvement may vary across firms due to different 
production technologies.
12 An infrastructure investment within a particular region 
may change the industry composition of production by attracting industries that 
are intensive users of the services provided by the infrastructure improvement. A 
change in the industry composition of producers, following an infrastructure 
investment, would be partially reflected in a change in a region’s mean wage if 
wage rates vary across industries. Finally, if infrastructure is funded from within 
the region, then the effect on firms and households of taxes and loans raised will 
be different from that if it is externally funded (as assumed by the model).  
4  Feasibility of using the spatial equilibrium 
model to estimate marginal productivity 
effects of infrastructure in New Zealand 
The spatial equilibrium model described above provides a theoretical 
link between public infrastructure stocks, firm costs, and household expenditure to 
determine the value of a marginal infrastructure project to firms and households 
using adjustment in wages and land prices. A marginal infrastructure project is of 
positive value to a community (of firms and households) if it raises aggregate land 
prices. However, land prices alone are not sufficient to determine whether a 
marginal increase in public infrastructure stocks are valued more by firms than 
households, or vice versa. By including wages it is possible to determine whether 
the gains from a marginal infrastructure project are (overall) greater for firms 
(increase in wages) or households (decrease in wages). 
The basic spatial equilibrium model has been implemented empirically 
in a variety of ways to estimate the effects of factors such as infrastructure, 
industrial concentration, and urban agglomeration on productivity and amenity 
values. For instance, Haughwout (2002) and Rudd (2000) examined the effect of 
aggregate infrastructure investment on wages and house prices within US cities to 
determine the overall value of a marginal increase in infrastructure provision to 
firms and households. Gibbons and Machin (2005)
13 and McMillen and 
McDonald (2004) examined the impact of a new commuter rail transport route on 
                                                 
12 Fernald (1999) found that increases in the stock of roads lead to faster productivity growth in 
those industries that are more intensive users of road transport infrastructure. 
13 An application of the Gibbons and Machin (2005) study is to compare the ex-post shadow price 
of walking with the ex-ante prediction used as part of the project’s cost–benefit analysis. 
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house prices in London and Chicago respectively, as a way of estimating the value 
that commuters placed on the new infrastructure. A related literature (e.g. Glaeser 
et al, 2005) uses similar models to estimate the determinants of house prices and 
supply.  
While each of these examples is clearly relevant to our interest in 
estimating the productivity effects of specific infrastructure projects, the empirical 
models used address somewhat different questions. Haughwout (2002) and Rudd 
(2000) are interested in the effects on productivity and amenity values of changes 
in the comprehensively measured aggregate stock of infrastructure across selected 
urban locations.
14 Gibbons and Machin (2005) and McMillen and McDonald 
(2004) do not attempt to estimate the productivity effects per se of the particular 
infrastructure projects they investigate, but rather their value to the affected 
households. We are not aware of any studies that use a spatial equilibrium model 
to estimate the productivity effects of particular infrastructure projects. 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the elaborations on the basic 
model, the empirical strategies and identification issues, the broad data 
requirements, and the availability of data in New Zealand that would be required 
to implement such a study. The section also briefly discusses the characteristics of 
infrastructure projects that would be most amenable to a study of this sort, and 
tentatively suggests possible projects that may be worth further investigation. 
  Section 4.1 outlines a broad conceptual model that would form the basis 
for specifying an empirical model to estimate the productivity effects of a specific 
infrastructure project. It identifies a range of variables that are relevant to such a 
model, identification issues, and briefly discusses strategies to address these 
                                                 
14 Even if this was the question of prime interest to policy, the requirements for comprehensive 
measures of the infrastructure stock in particular locations over time would preclude its 
implementation in New Zealand. An audit of current public infrastructure stocks has been 
conducted by the Ministry of Economic Development (see PWC report), but the report provides an 
overview for the whole country and does not measure stocks by geographic region and across 
time. 
15 issues. Section 4.2 reviews and draws lessons from the empirical strategies and 
identification issues addressed in the four studies referred to above. Section 4.3 
reviews New  Zealand data available for estimating such a model. Section 4.4 
discusses criteria for selecting a specific infrastructure project for analysis and 
tentatively suggests some projects that may be worth further investigation. 
Section 4.5 concludes with an outline of the next steps required to establish the 
feasibility of a full-scale study. 
4.1  Elaborating on the basic conceptual model 
In order to obtain an unbiased estimate of the relationship between 
wages, land prices, population growth, and public infrastructure stocks, the 
empirical model has to separate out the effect of a rise in infrastructure services 
from all other effects that may explain differences in wages, land rents, and 
population growth between locations (dependent variables in Table 2, panel A). 
Wage rates, land prices, and population growth will differ across locations due to 
public infrastructure provision and other location-specific amenities (e.g. warmer 
climate).  
Individual characteristics 
In addition the average wage rate can be expected to vary between 
locations due to differences in the workforce, for example, some regions may 
have a relatively large share of younger inexperienced workers compared with 
other regions. Panel B in Table 2 outlines the main factors that explain wage rate 
differences between individuals. High-skilled workers, on average, can be 
expected to have a higher wage rate compared with low-skilled workers. A worker 
can acquire skills from attending school and from on-the-job training.
15 An 
individual’s level of work experience will depend on their age minus the time 
spent not in employment (e.g. education, unemployment spells, and childcare).
16 
Some individuals may acquire additional skills from their family or community 
group (e.g. religious training) or belong to a large community that increases the 
number of potential job contacts and leads to better job matching prospects. Wage 
rates may also differ between industry sectors and occupations for reasons 
                                                 
15 The marginal effect of an additional year at school or on-the-job training may diminish with 
each additional year. 
16 Including gender may control for most of the difference in wage rates due to childcare 
responsibilities. 
16  
unrelated to skill levels.
17 Central city workers may be able to achieve a higher 
wage rate due to a greater range of job opportunities (better job matching), 
compared to workers within rural locations with fewer job opportunities.
18
Table 2: Estimation variables (dependent and controls) 
 
A Dependent variables 
•  Hourly wages rate 
•  Land prices – by residential, commercial, 
industrial and agricultural land 
•  Population 
B Individual characteristics 
•  Years of completed schooling/Academic 
achievement 
•  Work experience (number of years in 
employment) 
•  Community group 
•  Industry sector 
•  Occupation 
•  Urban location 
D Unproduced local amenities 
•  Sunshine hours 
•  Rainfall 
•  Annual temperature 
•  Number of heating days 
•  Mean distance to beaches and national 
parks 
E Produced local amenities 
•  Level of local infrastructure stocks 
•  Local taxes 
•  Quality of schools 
•  Crime level 
C Property characteristics 
•  Type (e.g. house/apartment) 
•  Lot size 
•  No. of units on same lot 
•  Building area 
•  Number of floors 
 
•  Age 
•  Quality 
 
•  No. of rooms 
•  No. of bedrooms 
•  No. of bathrooms 
•  Basement 
•  Attic 
•  Elevator 
•  Central heating/air conditioning 
•  Garage (single/double) 
•  Reticulated water and sewage 
 
F Other 
•  Transport costs – wages, fuel, new cars, 
public transport 
•  Housing stock and changes in housing 
stock 
•  Housing density 
•  Zoning restrictions and changes in zoning 
restrictions 
 
                                                 
17 Including information on industry sector and occupation will control for any variation in the 
wage rate caused by changes in the (industry) composition of producers following an infrastructure 
investment. 
18 Workers may earn a higher wage rate due to their natural ability (e.g. physical characteristics), 
which is difficult to capture. 
17 Property characteristics 
The price of a parcel of land is used within the spatial equilibrium 
model as a proxy measure to value the stream of services generated from a 
particular location. However, when properties are sold or rented,
19 the price 
usually combines the value of the land parcel with any improvements (e.g. 
buildings). Improvements to a land parcel are usually durable, making them 
expensive to remove and replace. Therefore the prospective buyer or renter makes 
a bid that reflects the value of the property’s location and any improvements that 
have already been made. A property’s sale or rental price will vary across 
locations due to the location-specific amenities and the mix of improvements that 
have been made to the land parcel (e.g. size, type, and quality of buildings). The 
value of the land improvements will depend on their characteristics. For 
residential buyers and renters their preferences are easier to model, for example, 
larger properties are preferred to smaller properties. However, the preferences of 
buyers and renters of properties for commercial use will vary depending on the 
type of business they intend to use the property for. For example, an insurance 
company would require a different building from a car repair business. 
The spatial equilibrium model assumes that a firm and a household can 
compete for the same location (land use is freely interchangeable between users). 
Therefore, firms and households will be exposed to the same change in land rents 
due to a change in the level of public infrastructure services. The assumption that 
land is freely interchangeable between users (firms and households) might not 
hold if a local government authority divided their administration region into 
residential and commercial zones. Under this scenario firms and households 
would compete in separate land markets over the short term (because they do not 
compete for the same locations). Land use would change between residential and 
commercial use only when the local authority amended the zones. Therefore, it 
would not be possible to measure only changes in the price of land used for 
residential purposes as a proxy for the average change in land prices experienced 
by firms and households. Under the assumption that land use is freely 
                                                 
19 The rental price should exclude utility costs (e.g. heating) as it makes it difficult to assess the 
effect of location-specific amenities on the rental price if they also influence the expenditure on 
utilities. For example, households in locations that have a relatively high average annual 
temperature will spend less on heating than households in locations where annual temperatures are 
lower. 
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interchangeable, panel C of Table 2 lists the characteristics of a residential 
property that are most likely to be related to its price.
20 The property 
characteristics define the type and size of the property, the condition and age of 
the property, and the types of accommodation services the property supplies. 
Alternatively, if available, data on prices for different types of land—
residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural—may assist in identifying the 
incidence of benefits. 
Local amenities 
The next part of the estimation model is contained within panels D 
and E of Table 2 and captures the effect of local amenities on the wage rate, land 
price, and population growth. Local amenities can be characterised as either 
unproduced (panel D) or produced (panel E). Unproduced local amenities are 
those that are exogenous to a region, whereas produced amenities can be either 
exogenous or endogenous to a region. Unproduced amenities include the local 
climate (e.g. number of sunshine hours, level of rainfall and mean annual 
temperature) and proximity to the coastline (beaches), national parks, and rivers. 
Produced amenities might include the quality of local schools, regional crime 
levels, taxes, and public infrastructure provision. 
In relation to local taxes, the magnitude of the effect on wages, land 
prices and population growth from a public infrastructure investment may depend 
on whether the infrastructure investment is funded from outside (e.g. central 
government) or from within (e.g. local government) a location. If an infrastructure 
project is funded wholly or partly from the local purse, then it is possible that the 
productivity and amenity gains will be offset by an increase in local taxes (i.e. 
wages, land prices, and population growth may not adjust as much as if the 
investment was exogenously funded). 
                                                 
20 The assumption that firms and households are exposed to the same land market is a common 
approach adopted within the literature. 
19 Elasticity of housing supply 
The basic spatial equilibrium model and the four studies reviewed in the 
next section assume that the value to firms and households in a community of 
raising public infrastructure stocks will be fully capitalised into adjustments in 
land prices. However, Glaeser et al (2005) argue that if the supply of housing 
within a location is elastic, then a rise in public infrastructure stocks may lead to 
an increase in the supply of housing. If housing supply is not inelastic or elastic, 
then productivity and amenity effects caused by an increase in infrastructure will 
not be fully reflected in prices. 
Glaeser et al (2005) assume that the supply of new housing will be a 
function of the cost of construction, which in turn is related to local building 
regulations and the current density of housing. (The authors assume that building 
high-rise accommodation is more expensive than building single residential units). 
For a particular location that has few barriers to new construction and/or low 
housing density, housing supply will be relatively elastic compared with locations 
where barriers to construction and/or housing density are higher.
21 If housing 
supply within a location is relatively elastic (e.g. a new subdivision), then land 
prices may still rise in line with construction (which will increase with housing 
density), but at a lower rate compared with a location with relatively inelastic 
supply. Elastic housing supply will also mitigate a rise in wages and labour 
demand will be met by an increase in the number of workers.  
Glaeser et al (2005) find strong evidence that differences in elasticity of 
housing supply are positively related to measures of housing density and 
restrictiveness of regulation. In turn, differences in the elasticity of supply have 
the predicted effect on the extent to which house prices rise in response to 
productivity shocks.  
If housing supply is elastic, and housing price responses are to be used 
to identify the productivity effects of infrastructure, then housing supply 
responses need to be accommodated in the model. This is likely to be a particular 
issue for a New Zealand study, as the supply of housing in New Zealand cities is 
                                                 
21 Glaeser et al (2005) find that, for US metropolitan regions, where building regulation is limited 
and population density is low, growth is likely to take the form of higher population levels. For 
regions with restrictive building regulations and a higher population density, growth is 
predominantly reflected in higher wages and house prices. 
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almost certainly more elastic than in the majority of the cities covered in the four 
studies referred to above and reviewed in Section 4.2. In these studies, which 
cover mature central city locations, the issue of housing supply is effectively 
ignored, reflecting an assumption of inelastic supply.  
Direct measures of housing supply (changes in the stock of houses) or 
population increase, or proxies for elasticity in the form of housing density 
measures, and measures of the restrictiveness of regulation (together with 
measures of house price rises) may help identify the effects of additional 
infrastructure provision in a particular location.  
Transport costs 
The spatial equilibrium model predicts that changes in transport costs 
will affect outcomes across space. Transport costs incorporate changes in wages, 
but also petrol costs and the price of new cars (including depreciation), and also 
include, where relevant, public transport. Changes in any of these may be useful 
in identifying incidence of the benefits of infrastructural innovation. 
As noted in the next section, the conceptual model outlined above has 
been specified in two distinct ways (depending on the question of interest) and 
econometric estimation techniques have been used to address the problem of 
unobserved variables.  
Panel F in Table 2 incorporates variables to address elasticity of 
housing supply and changes in transport costs.  
4.2  Lessons from studies using a spatial equilibrium 
model to estimate the benefits of infrastructure 
Haughwout (2002) uses comprehensive data on infrastructure stocks in selected 
US cities over time to estimate the marginal effects of infrastructure on 
21 house prices and thus the benefits to households and firms combined.
22 He uses 
data on wage changes to estimate how many of these benefits are due to 
productivity increases, and how many are due to an increase in amenities of value 
to households. He calculates whether an average city’s willingness to pay for a 
marginal increase in aggregate infrastructure stocks (as measured by the 
movement in house prices due to the increase) is outweighed by its cost.  
One problem with using geographic regions is that the boundaries are 
often predefined (e.g. city administration boundaries) and may not capture the 
total benefits created by infrastructure investment. Haughwout (2002) used central 
city boundaries and found that the estimated benefit to firms and households from 
aggregate infrastructure investment is, on average, lower than the cost of the 
investment. However, Haughwout suggests that this could be due to some of the 
benefits from a city infrastructure investment spilling over into the adjacent 
suburbs.  
The ideal (geographic) unit of analysis for this type of study is one that 
encompasses both the local labour and housing markets, so that any adjustments 
in wages and house prices that occur due to a rise in the infrastructure stock are 
captured within the region. For example, Rudd (2000) used the larger US 
metropolitan regions that include a city’s central business district and the adjacent 
suburbs, and were designed to include the entire labour market (and housing 
market) associated with a city.
23
Gibbons and Machin (2005) and McMillen and McDonald (2004) 
examined the impact of a new commuter rail transport route on house prices in 
                                                 
22 Haughwout (2002) estimates two hedonic regression equations with two second-stage regression 
equations. The first-stage regression models control for variation in wages and house prices that is 
explained by differences in human capital levels and housing characteristics. The unexplained 
variation in wages and house prices across different regions and time periods (estimated by the 
first-stage models) is then regressed on factors that are specific to a region and point in time and 
include: local taxes, debt conditions, infrastructure stocks, and amenities. A problem with the two-
stage approach, adopted by Haughwout, is that the model assumes that housing characteristics and 
human capital variables are not correlated with region-time specific variables (e.g. infrastructure 
levels). For example, houses in poor infrastructure areas many be in a worse condition compared 
with houses in other areas because there is a reduced incentive to add value to a house where 
infrastructure levels are relatively low. Therefore, it may be more appropriate to include the 
region-time specific variables in the first-stage regression models. Another issue is that the shadow 
price of a characteristic (e.g. off-street parking, view of the sea) may vary across regions and time. 
A possible solution to this problem is discussed below. 
23 New Zealand local labour markets have been created using census data and are defined by 
maximising the proportion of residents that live and work in the same geographic region (Newell 
and Papps, 2001). 
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London and Chicago respectively. Instead of estimating the average adjustment in 
house prices before and after the new transport route became operational, both 
studies focused on how much property prices changed with increasing distance 
from the new transit stations. Incorporating information about the distance 
between households and transit stations in the estimation model makes it possible 
to determine the geographic extent of the impact of a specific infrastructure 
project on house prices. For example, Gibbons and Machin (2005) find that the 
effect of new commuter rail stations is highly valuable to households within 
2 kilometres of the station, after which the effect becomes very small. 
The estimated effect of explanatory variables in a spatial equilibrium 
model will be biased if unobserved characteristics of the location are correlated 
with any of them. This is most likely to occur with distance from the 
infrastructure project. The problem is that new transport stations (or infrastructure 
projects in general) may be located near other amenities that households value 
independently of access to public transport. For example, stations are often 
located in high street locations that offer retail outlets and entertainment centres. 
The location of stations may also be associated with negative characteristics, for 
example, higher crime and noise levels. 
Haughwout (2002), McMillen and McDonald (2004) and Gibbons and 
Machin (2005) used information on households for more than one time period and 
used panel estimation techniques to control for unobserved effects on house prices 
and wages that are specific to locations, but do not vary over time, and effects 
specific to a time period, but common to all locations.
24 For example, while some 
regions may have more hours of sunshine or some households may have a view of 
a park, the effect of the business cycle on house prices may vary across time, but 
remain constant across all locations. 
To control for pre-existing local area characteristics that may be 
correlated with distance to railway stations, McMillen and McDonald (2004) and 
Gibbons and Machin (2005) measured house prices in differences instead of 
levels. Measuring house prices in terms of differences controls for initial local 
area characteristics, but does not control for changes in local area characteristics 
                                                 
24 Rudd used only a single year cross section of regions and therefore could not control for 
unobserved location-specific and time-specific differences. 
23 due to the opening of a transport stations (e.g. more restaurants or a rise in crime 
rates). Therefore, the models are able to capture the nett benefit to the local 
residential community from a transport improvement. Gibbons and Machin show 
that cross-sectional estimates of the effect of the new infrastructure are 
considerably larger than those from their preferred ‘differences-in-differences’ 
methodology. 
However, a problem will still remain if there are unobserved 
characteristics of locations not caused by changes in infrastructure, whose effect 
on prices and wages varies over time. For instance, households may place an 
increasing premium on locations with a warm climate, beaches, and water views 
over the period in which the effects of infrastructure are estimated. One possible 
strategy is to use movement in house prices in other locations with these same 
amenities, to control for their effects in the location under study. (This strategy 
assumes that the movements in the two locations due to changes in the relative 
value of amenities are correlated.) 
Another important factor is identifying the time period over which 
wages, land prices, and population are likely to adjust. McMillen and McDonald 
(2004) detected house price adjustment, in anticipation of the opening of a new 
transit line in Chicago, up to 6 years before the actual opening of the line, which 
coincided with the announcement of the route for the proposed transit line.
25 The 
level of adjustment in land prices prior to a public infrastructure project may 
depend on the composition of household ownership. Gibbons and Machin (2005) 
ignore the possibility of anticipation effects. They examine house prices shortly 
before and after the infrastructure investment event on the basis that owner-
occupiers outnumber landlords by around 5 to 1 in the study area and have a 
shorter time horizon than landlords. (Landlords will invest early in the 
anticipation of capturing increased rents, whereas home owners are motivated to 
move by the availability of an amenity.)  
4.3  New Zealand data sources 
Section 4.1 set out a conceptual model for estimating the relationship 
between public infrastructure provision, wages, land prices, and population levels. 
                                                 
25 McMillen and McDonald (2004) found that house prices tended to overshoot and then adjust 
downwards once the transit line was in operation. 
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Section 4.2 briefly reviewed particular studies. This section examines whether 
existing datasets are available within New  Zealand to estimate a spatial 
equilibrium model. 
Table 3 summarises the variables required to estimate the effect on firm 
productivity of a specific infrastructure project. The variables can be divided into 
three groups. The first group includes the independent variables of wages and land 
rents. The second group includes the dependent variables of interest: level (value) 
of infrastructure provision (monetary value) and distance of the household from 
the infrastructure project. The third group includes the control variables and is 
divided into time-variant and time-invariant effects. Time-variant variables 
measure location-specific factors that are likely to change over time (e.g. the 
quality of local schools). Time-invariant factors are location-specific effects that 
are not expected to change throughout the period of study. The measurement of 
time-invariant factors (location-specific characteristics) is not necessary if a panel 
of observations across more than one time period is available, as location- and 
time-specific fixed effects can be used to control for unobserved effects. 
Similarly, the measurement of time-variant variables that are common across 
locations is not necessary if a differences-in-differences approach to estimation is 
used. Essentially, the effect of changes in these variables on locations that are not 
influenced by the change in infrastructure controls for their effect in the locations 
that are. 
Wage and income data is available for New  Zealand from three 
datasets. The New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings records the total 
income of individuals, aged 15 years and older, every 5 years. The last four 
censuses (1986, 1991, 1996, and 2001) are available aggregated to small 
geographical areas called meshblocks (MBs).
26 The New Zealand Income Survey 
(NZIS) and Household Economic Survey (HES), conducted annually and every 
3 years respectively, contain information on labour and non-labour income for 
individuals. However, the geographic resolution of the survey datasets is not as 
good as that of the census (main urban areas and the rest of New Zealand) and the 
time period covered by the two surveys is restricted to the 1990s to the present. 
                                                 
26 A meshblock is equivalent to a city block and contains on average 100 people. 
25 All three datasets contain demographic information about individuals that would 
be suitable to control for most of the differences in wages between individuals. 
Unit record house price data is available from the early 1980s to the 
present from Quotable Value Limited (QV). As the dataset is drawn from an 
administrative database, individual house sales can be aggregated to customisable 
geographical zones and time periods. QV data exist that break down the capital 
value of properties into both their land component and their improvements 
component. If this breakdown is reliable (and there is no reason to presume that it 
is not), it could be useful in disentangling some of the effects being measured. 
Data also exist on vacant land values, which can be used as a cross-check on the 
other data. Additionally, data exist on a valuation basis for all properties in a 
meshblock as well as for sales prices (where the latter applies only to those 
properties that are sold). The main disadvantage of the QV database is that the 
characteristics of properties (e.g. lot size, number of bedrooms) are poorly 
recorded. This will make it difficult, in cross-sectional estimation, to control for 
differences in property sale prices between locations that are accounted for by 
differences in the housing stock.
27 However, it may be reasonable to assume that 
relative quality of the housing stock in different locations changes only slowly 
over time. 
Each property can be located in a particular land parcel to calculate the 
distance between a land parcel and a specific infrastructure project. Gibbons and 
Machin (2005) and McMillen and McDonald (2004) measured distance between 
postcode regions (slightly smaller than MBs) to the infrastructure project (railway 
stations).
28
It may be reasonable to assume that the effect of many unproduced 
regional amenities (e.g. climate) will not vary over time and could thus be 
controlled for by using location-specific fixed effects in the estimation model. 
Nevertheless, as discussed in Section 4.2, it is possible that the value of these to 
households or firms does change over time, and it may be necessary to use data on 
                                                 
27 Unit record property sales data is available also from other sources (e.g. DTZ, www.dtz.co.nz) 
with apparently reliable detail on individual property characteristics. 
28 Both these studies used Euclidean distances between properties (meshblocks) and railway 
stations. Checks were made to control for trips that were impossible, e.g. across rivers. Road 
distance would be more appropriate, but within New Zealand the road network data is incomplete. 
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house price movements from other regions with similar amenities to control for 
effects in the location with new infrastructure.  
Produced amenities could be expected to change over time and it is 
important to control for these. Local authorities collect property rates to pay for 
local services. Motu Economic and Public Policy Research has put together a rates 
database for New Zealand TLAs from 1991 to the present. Information about the 
relative quality of schools in terms of academic outcomes has only recently been 
collected for all of New Zealand. The New Zealand Police regularly publish crime 
figures across New Zealand. 
Table 3: New Zealand data 
 
Measure Variable  name/description  New Zealand data sources 
Dependent variables     
Wages  Income/wages  Census (5 yearly, annual 
income), NZIS, HES (annual, 
hourly and weekly salary 
rates) 
Land prices  Valuations and sale price (land 
and improved) 
Unit record continuous house 
price data (1981-present) 
QV database. Also includes 
commercial property prices. 
Data available from other 
commercial sources (DTZ) 
Population levels  Usually resident population  Census of population and 
dwellings, NZIS and HES 
Individual characteristics     
Human capital characteristics  Years of completed 
schooling/Academic 
achievement 
Work experience (number of 





Census, NZIS, HES 
Property characteristics    
Housing characteristics  Bedrooms, bathrooms, floor 
area, age of property, central 
heating, garage, property type 
Floor area and property type 
available from QV database. 
Other commercially available 
data (e.g. DTZ) have data on 
individual property 
characteristics 
Distance to infrastructure 
investment 
Euclidean/road distance 
between firms and households 







Number of heating days 
Mean distance to beaches and 
 NIWA 
LINZ topographic database 




Level of local infrastructure 
stocks 
Local taxes 
Quality of schools 
Crime level 
  TLA and RC local rates 
database, Motu: Economic 
and Public Policy Research 




Value of public infrastructure 
stock for different types (e.g. 
roads) 
TLA annual reporting of 
assets (from 1991), Central 
government agencies (e.g. 
Land Transport New Zealand) 
and Private companies 
responsible for public 
infrastructure assets. 
Notes: Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS), New Zealand Income Survey (NZIS), Household 
Economic Survey (HES), Linked Employer Employee Database (LEED), DTZ (www.dtz.co.nz) 
4.4  Identification of a specific infrastructure project 
The discussion in the previous three sections helps identify the sort of 
infrastructure project for which a variant of the spatial equilibrium model may 
usefully be used to measure productivity effects. Briefly, the infrastructure project 
needs, first, to have effects on productivity that vary across geographic space. In 
particular, there should be some expectation that a public infrastructure project 
will provide a sufficient incentive for firms and households to want to change 
their location. For example, investments in the national (electricity) grid will 
probably benefit all firms and households within New  Zealand (nationwide 
effect), whereas the effect of investing in the local distribution of electricity within 
a region will only affect the firms and households located within the region and 
can be compared with other regions where local electricity lines investment may 
be lower or higher. 
Second, the infrastructure project will need to have large enough effects 
to be detectable given noisy data and other factors influencing variation in house 
prices and wages. 
A panel-based ‘differences-in-differences’ approach is likely to produce 
estimates that are less biased by omitted variables, and will in any case reduce the 
need for data on time-invariant characteristics of locations. The data thus needs to 
encompass the relevant geographic range of the effects and the period of time over 
which wages, land prices, and population levels may adjust.  
The most obvious candidates for a study of this sort would be additions 
to road and rail networks that have geographically concentrated benefits. Given 
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the lack of investment in additions to the rail network in New Zealand, the most 
likely projects are significant additions to roading. Possible candidates include 
projects such as the Tauranga Harbour bridge, the Auckland south-west motorway 
link, or the extension to Auckland’s northern motorway. Water supply projects 
(such as the Waikato River pipeline to Auckland) or local electricity transmission 
projects (such as the renovation of Auckland’s transmission infrastructure) might 
also have measurable effects. 
As noted above, the level of spatial aggregation used in estimation may 
be important in deriving the results. For some purposes, labour market areas 
(LMAs) may be the best unit of analysis. In some areas, the LMA and territorial 
local authority (TLA) may coincide. However, in other cases (e.g. Auckland) it is 
very likely that the LMA will include a number of different TLAs. This could be 
very useful in disentangling effects—especially relating to new residential 
construction—since regulatory regimes may differ across TLAs within the same 
LMA. 
4.5  Recommendations on the feasibility of implementing 
a spatial equilibrium model within New Zealand 
This report has identified a range of issues that will bear on the 
feasibility of implementing a spatial equilibrium model to estimate the 
productivity effects of a specific infrastructure project in New Zealand. Some of 
the most salient issues are: 
•  the availability of data with an appropriate range over time and space to 
implement a differences in differences estimation methodology 
•  the feasibility of addressing the issue of elastic housing supply (unless it 
is reasonable to assume that this is not an issue in the particular case) 
•  the reasonableness of assumptions of unchanging relative quality across 
locations (given poor data on housing quality) 
•  the feasibility of controlling for time-varying characteristics of locations 
(such as the changing value put on amenities such as beaches and 
climate) 
29 •  the need or otherwise to control for other time-varying characteristics of 
locations—such as school quality and crime rates—that may change 
only slightly over the relevant time period. 
Judgements on these issues can be made only in relation to an identified 
infrastructure project. However, at this point it looks feasible to explain regional 
property values (especially of different types of property), wages, population, 
housing stock, and stock of other structures in a region affected by a new 
infrastructure project by reference to (inter alia): TLA zoning regulations, local 
commodity prices, (instrumented) value of certain amenities, direct measures of 
certain amenities (e.g. crime levels and school quality), transport costs, and other 
national effects (such as changing industry patterns).  
We recommend that in the next phase of this study, an empirical model 
be specified aimed at estimating the productivity effects of an identified 
infrastructure project. This will then inform a decision to proceed to a full-scale 
study. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the feasibility of using a variant of the 
spatial equilibrium model to estimate the productivity effects of a specific 
infrastructure project in New Zealand. The paper highlights that there are a variety 
of objectives that infrastructure investments are designed to achieve, and decisions 
are also subject to other competing objectives being taken into account. It is not 
obvious that the decision rules used in infrastructure investment will necessarily 
lead to projects that have nett positive effects on productivity. Policy makers are 
interested in the marginal effects of infrastructure investment on productivity. An 
evaluation of such effects would provide a useful check on the appropriateness 
and adequacy of current decision rules and institutions. 
Aggregate cost and production function approaches have been used in 
the literature to estimate the effects of changes in the stock of infrastructure on 
productivity. These approaches entail unrealistic assumptions about either 
unchanging costs or unchanging prices. In contrast, a spatial equilibrium approach 
takes into account the effects of factor mobility on costs and prices. It assumes 
that the nett amenity and productivity benefits of infrastructure investments are 
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fully reflected in land rents, and that the distribution of benefits between firms and 
households is reflected in wage movements. Data on land rents (property values) 
and wages may therefore be used to estimate the productivity effects of changes in 
the stock of infrastructure, and of specific infrastructure projects. 
There are examples in the literature of a spatial equilibrium approach to 
estimating the productivity effects of changes in the stock of infrastructure. There 
are also examples of the approach being used to estimate the benefits to 
commuters of particular infrastructure projects. To date, there appear to be no 
examples of using a spatial equilibrium model to estimate the productivity effects 
of a specific infrastructure project. However, the analysis in this paper suggests 
that such an approach is feasible. 
There are a range of data and estimation issues that need to be 
addressed in the use of a spatial equilibrium model for this purpose. These include 
the ability to control for time-varying and time-invariant characteristics of 
locations that may be correlated with changes in land values and wages; and the 
availability of data to cover the relevant geographic and time span of productivity 
effects. A reasonably useful range of data is available in New Zealand for this 
purpose. The next steps in determining feasibility are to select a particular 
infrastructure project, and to develop an empirical model based on available data. 
31 6  Appendix A: Road infrastructure 
investment within New Zealand 
Road transport policy within New  Zealand is the responsibility of 
central government and is contained within the Land Transport Management Act 
2003 (LTMA). The LTMA shifted the policy of land transport management from 
providing a safe and efficient road network to one that is integrated, safe, 
responsive, and sustainable. Land Transport New Zealand (LTNZ) is the central 
government agency responsible for implementing the LTMA through the 
development of the National Land Transport Programme (NLTP). The key 
objectives of the NLTP are: 
•  assisting economic development 
•  assisting safety and personal security 
•  improving access and mobility 
•  protecting and promoting public health 
•  ensuring environmental sustainability. 
Before the introduction of the LTMA, land transport projects were 
developed to provide a safe and efficient roading system as their first priority, 
with additional objectives of mitigating public health and environmental concerns. 
However, the LTMA specifies that LTNZ should not prioritise any of the five key 
objectives and that all the objectives need to be considered equally in the planning 
process. The five key objectives, listed above, are applied at a macro level while 
individual road projects often focus on just a couple of objectives. 
  The NLTP sets out a programme of road maintenance and construction 
projects that Land Transport New  Zealand jointly funds with approved 
organisations. Approved organisations are responsible for the identification and 
proposal of road maintenance and construction projects. LTNZ approves projects 
for funding by ensuring the project is economically viable
29 and meets the 
requirements of the LTMA.
30 The NLTP is funded by the National Land 
Transport Fund (NLTF), which receives funds from road user charges, motor 
                                                 
29 The benefits outweigh the cost of the project. 
30 It is assumed that NLTP has to collectively meet the requirements of LTMA and not individual 
road projects. 
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vehicle registration, fuel excise, and licensing.
31 Differences between the 
projected revenue and revenue received by the NLTF are accommodated by 
changes in NLTP (number of projects funded). In addition to the maintenance and 
construction of roads the NLTF covers a range of land transport issues, including 
safety (Land Transport Safety Authority), enforcement (police), public transport, 
and the promotion of walking and cycling. 
The identification of a need for road infrastructure investment is the 
responsibility of territorial local authorities (TLAs) and Transit New  Zealand. 
TLAs
32 are responsible for the maintenance and construction of local roads within 
their jurisdiction. Transit New Zealand, a central government agency, is in charge 
of managing the state highway network. Transit New Zealand receives 100% of 
its funding from LTNZ, whereas TLAs receive, on average, 50% of maintenance 
costs and 60% of construction costs,
33 with the remainder coming from locally 
generated revenues and/or supplementary funds.
34
LTNZ is responsible for aiding an approved authority in formulating a 
proposal for road funding, providing the framework for assessing the benefits and 
costs of an investment, and approving or declining the application for funds.
35 The 
following steps are involved in obtaining LTNZ approval for funding for road 
projects: 
1  Formulation  Approved authorities submit proposals in accordance with the 
LTMA (and with guidance from LTNZ). 
2  Assessment  Approved authorities conduct an assessment of the proposal 
using LTNZ’s assessment framework. 
3  Prioritisation  Proposals are ranked and funds provisionally allocated. 
4  Programming  The NTLP is created from the ranked proposals and lined up 
with available finance. 
5  Approval  Reassessment of stage 2 before approval is granted. 
6  Monitoring  Feedback to proposing authorities. 
                                                 
31 Additional funding is provided by the Crown Account (specific funding for Auckland land 
transport) and from miscellaneous sources ($33 million). 
32 New Zealand has 74 TLAs (including the Chatham Islands). 
33 With the exception of Northland and Tairawhiti who receive 100% of their regional road 
programme funding from Land Transport New Zealand as part of the Regional Transport Fund, 
which is designed to assist ‘acute’ regions that cannot meet their funding contribution requirement. 
34 Supplementary funds can include toll revenues, capital sums borrowed against tolling revenue, 
concession agreement payments, and developer contributions. 
35 The decision not to grant funding often, but not always, stops a road project from proceeding. 
33 6.1 Assessment  process 
The aim of the assessment process is to evaluate the total costs and 
benefits of a proposed road project to the local community. If the benefit-to-cost 
ratio of the proposed road project is greater than one, then the road project is 
regarded as economically viable and eligible for funding from LTNZ. If the 
proposal includes several alternative scenarios, the incremental costs and benefits 
of adopting a larger scheme with higher costs or a smaller scheme with lower 
costs are assessed. 
The major effects of a proposed road project considered within the 
economic assessment are on road users, principally travel time savings, changes in 
vehicle operating costs, and changes in the accident rate. For effects on non-road 
users, or externalities, LTNZ divides the effects of road projects into tangibles—
effects that are easily converted into monetary terms such as travel time savings—
and intangibles—non-traded effects that have no established market price. For 
some intangible effects, quantitative values have been calculated (indicative 
value), whereas for other intangible effects, qualitative measures have been 
adopted (e.g. preference rankings). 
For each effect, the benefit (or cost) to the community is compared to a 
benchmark scenario, referred to by Land Transport New  Zealand as the ‘do 
minimum’ option. The ‘do minimum’ option is the level of investment required to 
maintain the current level of service. A proposed road project has a positive 
benefit if the effect is greater than the ‘do minimum’. 
6.1.1 Tangible  benefits 
Travel time 
The cost of travel time savings is calculated from a mix of direct site-
level observations and assumptions of traffic flow. The key factors in determining 
changes in travel costs are traffic composition, vehicle occupancy and travel 
purpose (work, commuting or leisure), current traffic volumes, expected traffic 
growth rates, future traffic volumes (created by the adoption of the proposed road 
project), average travel times, and average speeds. 
Traffic composition, vehicle occupancy, and travel purpose are 
calculated for different road categories and time periods and are determined using 
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average values for New Zealand. However, if the project is fiscally large or the 
site has unusual traffic characteristics, then traffic composition, vehicle 
occupancy, and travel purpose are observed directly. Traffic volume data is 
collected using sample counts to produce an average daily traffic volume (AADT) 
and adjusted using concurrent axle counts (or national level averages for urban 
and rural roads if local counts are not available). The AADT is adjusted to provide 
weekday and weekend/holiday daily flows either from direct measurements or 
using Transit New Zealand’s traffic counting guidelines if local counts are not 
available. Depending on the type of road project additional estimates are made for 
hourly traffic flows (e.g. rush hour periods). 
Growth rates in traffic flows are predicted for the current road network, 
using regression models, from count data or taken from estimated regional 
averages (predicted using 1980–2000 data) if local counts are not available. The 
growth rate models take into consideration population growth, gross domestic 
product and car ownership
36. Future traffic volumes differ from growth rates 
because they incorporate the proposed changes to the road network. The 
assessment of future traffic volumes takes into consideration predicted traffic 
growth (as above), the effect the road project might have on diverting existing 
traffic, inducing additional traffic (the null hypothesis being that new projects do 
not induce additional traffic or redistribute trips), and the effect of intermittent 
traffic. Average travel times and average vehicle speeds are measured using 
survey techniques or default values (which are nationally or regionally estimated). 
The cost of transport (in terms of time) is estimated by road category 
and time period using the road composition tables described above. The additional 
cost of congestion (i.e. what an individual would be willing to pay to avoid sitting 
in traffic) is also calculated. In addition it is assumed that users are also prepared 
to pay for improvements in trip reliability (i.e. more consistent travel times). 
Vehicle operating costs 
Vehicle operating costs (VOC) are calculated from fuel, oil, and tyre 
costs and the cost of maintenance, repairs, and depreciation for different vehicles 
and road types. The base running costs are adjusted by site-specific factors, 
                                                 
36 Evidence suggests that growth rates are reasonably stable and only major events have any effect 
(e.g. doubling of fuel prices during the 1973 oil crisis). 
35 including traffic composition, travel speed, road gradient, road conditions (surface 
quality), and congestion costs (cost of decelerating and accelerating). 
Accident rates 
There are three methods for measuring site-specific accident rates 
depending on the availability of site data. Accident-by-accident analysis (using 
site-specific historical accident data) is conducted if the site has accident data with 
at least five accidents recorded over the last 5 years. Accident rate analysis is used 
if no accident data is available and the accident rate is interpolated using similar 
site data. Weighted accident procedure is used if there is site-specific data, but 
fewer than five accidents over the last 5 years have been recorded. This procedure 
incorporates information for the specific site and similar sites to arrive at an 
accident rate. Predictions are adjusted for overall reduction in the national 
accident rate and for different travelling speeds (50 and 70 kph). The predicted 
change in the accident rate is weighted by the cost of injuries calculated by LTNZ. 
Benefits of sealing unsealed roads 
The benefits of sealing roads (specific to a road project) include the 
increase in crop and animal yields (in fields adjacent to the road) due to dust 
reduction, improvements in driver and passenger comfort, savings in vehicle 
operation costs, and travel time savings. 
6.1.2 Intangible  benefits 
The following intangible effects (externalities) are considered: air 
quality, carbon dioxide emissions, road traffic noise, vibration, water quality, 
special areas, ecological impact, visual impacts, community severance, 
overshadowing, isolation, psychological distress, site-specific discomfort, and 
health benefits of walking and cycling. 
6.1.3  Uncertainty in the assessment of road project benefits 
The section above briefly reviews the methodology involved in 
calculating the tangible benefits to the community of a proposed road project. 
Benefits are converted into dollars to allow road projects with a different mix of 
benefits to be compared. The process of determining the value of a particular 
benefit (e.g. reduced travel times) involves three factors. The first factor is the 
measurement of current conditions, which can involve direct measurements of the 
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proposed site or imputed average conditions for the region or New Zealand as a 
whole. The second factor is the methodology used to estimate the future 
conditions once the road project has been completed. The third factor is the 
change in conditions weighted by the (perceived) value (dollars) of that change. 
As part of the funding application, LTNZ requires the approved 
authority to conduct sensitivity analysis on the assumptions and estimates made in 
evaluating the benefits of a road project. Assumptions and estimates made in the 
calculations must be documented and the evaluation must be rerun using upper 
and lower bounds to assess how sensitive the results are to changes in estimated or 
imputed values. Another factor that might bias the total calculated benefits from a 
road project is the value placed on a particular benefit. For example, benefits 
could be biased if travel time is overvalued compared with the value of reducing 
accidents (cost of a life). In this scenario, road projects that concentrate on 
reducing travel times might be favoured over road projects that are focused on 
reducing the accident rate. This could have an effect on road projects of a similar 
value that focus on different benefits. 
37 7  Appendix B: Issues in the use of 
aggregate production function models 
Early aggregate production function (APF) models used time-series 
data from a single country to estimate the effect of public infrastructure 
investment on productivity growth.
37 A key criticism of using a time-series dataset 
for a single country is the possibility of omitted variable bias (De la Fuente, 
2000b). For example, the simultaneous decline in production and public 
infrastructure investment in the US during the 1970s, observed by Aschauer 
(1989), could have been a coincidence. Gramlich (1994) suggests that the fall in 
infrastructure investment was due to the completion of the inter-state highway 
network and a decrease in the school-age population.
38 A second problem is the 
issue of the ‘spurious regressions’ problem. The question is whether regressions 
that contain non-stationary variables (variables that display a trend) should be 
estimated using levels or first differences (percentage change).
39 De la Fuente 
argues that recent advances in econometrics have suggested that levels provide 
better estimates as long as the variables are co-integrated. However, these new 
techniques do not completely support the use of levels as there is still considerable 
variation in the estimated effect of public infrastructure on output across studies 
that have used co-integration. 
Estimating APFs using a panel dataset that combines observations for 
several years and different countries or regions mitigates some of the econometric 
issues levelled against using single country time-series data. Panel datasets are 
less susceptible to the spurious regressions problem arising from common trends 
in the data and provide the ability to control for unobserved differences between  
                                                 
37 Aschauer (1989) was one of the first authors to use an APF, to estimate the effect of public 
infrastructure investment on productivity growth using US time-series data from the 1970s. 
Aschauer found that a 10% increase in public infrastructure stocks produced a 3.9% increase in 
national output. It has been suggested that Aschauer’s high estimate of the productivity of public 
infrastructure is implausible. Munnell (1992) finds Archauer’s results difficult to believe because 
the coefficient on public infrastructure stocks is higher than private capital stocks, particularly as 
public capital stocks include ‘non-productive’ investments (e.g. a children’s playground). 
38 Other omitted variables could include a dramatic rise in energy prices. For example, Tatom 
(1991) found that including the price of oil reduced Aschauer’s reported coefficient. 
39 Using first differences tends to bias downwards the effect of public infrastructure investment on 
productivity growth. 
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countries and regions using fixed effects models.
40 Regional analysis does bring 
additional problems of endogeneity in the decision-making process of 
infrastructure investment. For example, at the country, level rich countries will 
demand more infrastructure compared with poorer countries, potentially biasing 
upward the estimate of public capital investment on production. Within a country 
there could also be an upward bias if regional governments are responsible for 
financing infrastructure investments. The bias could be reversed if public 
investment decisions are made by central government that use infrastructure 
investment to redistribute income to the regions. From a theoretical perspective 
regional models implicitly recognise that most (non-military) public capital stock 
is owned by state and local authorities. These authorities are likely to want to 
internalise the benefits from infrastructure investment within their own borders. 
                                                 
40  Researchers (Munnell, 1992; Eberts, 1990) using regional data found the effect of public 
infrastructure stocks on output to be positive and significant, however the size of the effect relative 
to Aschauer’s coefficient of 0.39 was smaller (around 0.15). Further analysis using fixed effects to 
control for any unobserved state level differences reduced the elasticity to zero (Holtz-Eakin, 
1994; Garcia-Mila et. al., 1996).  
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